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ABSTRACT
1
 
There is growing evidence on the importance of institutions for growth but limited 
understanding of the mechanisms of institutional divergence, persistence and change. 
Focusing on the judicial, starting from formalism indicators developed under the legal 
origin theory, but following different explanatory paths, we propose a thought 
experiment assessing reasonable preferences of judges and lawyers regarding 
formalism. We find a striking divergence, with lawyers showing preferences for high, 
and judges for low, formalism. This may generate institutional conflict, resistance to 
reforms and a dynamic equilibrium at an inefficient level. The analysis offers paths for 
reform, potentially addressing limitations of institutional approaches. 
 
Political economy; economic growth; institutions; legal origin theory. 
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There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to 
conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the 
introduction of a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in 
all those who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in 
all those who would profit by the new order, this lukewarmness 
arising partly from fear of their adversaries … and partly from the 
incredulity of mankind, who do not truly believe in anything new until 
they have had actual experience of it. 
– Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (1532) 
 
Though we know that institutions, both economic and political, persist 
for long periods of time, often centuries (and sometimes millennia), 
we do not as yet have a satisfactory understanding of the mechanisms 
through which institutions persist (…) The important point here is that 
both institutional persistence and institutional change are equilibrium 
outcomes. Approaches positing institutional persistence as a matter of 
fact, and then thinking of institutional changes as unusual events will 
not be satisfactory. Both phenomena have to be analyzed as part of the 
same dynamic equilibrium framework”.  
– Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) 
 
The last structural and comprehensive reform of Portugal’s judicial 
system was in the 1930s.  
– Nuno Garoupa (2006) 
 
1. Introduction 
This Work Project develops a thought experiment to assess the preferences of 
judges and lawyers regarding the level of procedural formalism in the judicial system. 
The aim is to explore the way in which this exercise contributes towards a better 
understanding of concrete situations of persistence of inefficient institutions and also 
illuminate eventual policy avenues for institutional reform.  
The first section provides a brief overview of the relevant political economy 
literature on the role of institutions for economic growth and more specifically on recent 
work on institutional persistence and change. The second section, focused on 
methodological aspects, describes the assumptions and design of the thought experiment 
and of the procedural formalism index developed by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer (2003) on which it is based. The third section presents the results, 
while the fourth and final section discusses possible implications.    
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2. Review: Institutions and Growth 
We must ask whether political thought should not face from the beginning the 
possibility of bad government; (…) this leads to a new approach to the problem 
of politics, for it forces us to replace the question: “Who should rule?” by the 
new question: “How can we so organize political institutions that bad or 
incompetent rulers can be prevented from doing too much damage?  
– Karl Popper (1945) 
The above quote by one of the leading political philosophers in the western 
tradition can be interpreted as an invitation to economists to explore the central 
questions of politics. This is because the “new question” proposed by Popper fits nicely 
with the standard approaches in economics: it is impersonal, by not focusing on the 
personality of the rulers but on the outcomes of their actions; it is positive rather than 
normative in that it stresses observable outcomes not considerations of what “should” 
happen; and it is testable because it suggests criteria for assessing, comparing and 
judging the validity of different systems – namely, the minimization of “damage”
2
. This 
work project, in its analysis of institutional preferences of different groups, seeks to 
follow the same conceptual path.  
The insight at the origin of Popper’s new question is that perhaps it is 
methodologically safer to assume a bad outcome and then build institutions that 
minimize or eliminate its impact. It can be argued that this draws deeply from economic 
thought – the market, starting from Adam Smith’s formulation ([1776], 1999), is the 
chief example of an institution that, when working correctly, steers individual self-
interest into the path of collective welfare. The market does not assume the 
“benevolence of the butcher”. In recent decades, economists have been rising to this 
implicit Popperian challenge
3
. Within the branch of political economy there is already a 
                                                          
2
 A similar line of reasoning is present in F. A. Hayek’s influential postscript to The Constitution of 
Liberty, “Why I am not a Conservative”, in which he states “It is not who governs but what government is 
entitled to do that seems to me the essential problem.” 
3
 It can also be argued that recent work in political economy is simply a return of the discipline to its 18
th
 
and 19
th
 Century roots, in which political and economic questions were mostly intertwined. 
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vast and penetrating literature which has contributed towards the advancement of our 
understanding of the nature of political societies. Political economy in general, and 
work on institutions in particular, seeks a broader role for economics and a more 
interdisciplinary approach. It tends to incorporate contributions from historical research, 
political science and political theory, but it uses the extensive toolbox provided by 
macroeconomics, microeconomics and econometrics. Major examples in this field are 
the analysis of the role of institutions (North, 1990), rent-seeking behavior (Tullock, 
1967), on transaction costs (Coase, 1937), and the problem of collective action (Olson, 
1982). More recently, Daron Acemoglu and colleagues
4
 have been following closely in 
this tradition by posing questions regarding the compared effectiveness of different 
institutional settings and its role in explaining differences in growth levels and rates 
across countries. This work, again with parallels to Popper’s formulation, is prepared to 
assume the possibility of bad government, namely the institutional capture by certain 
groups, and instead of a normative approach on “who should govern”, focuses on a 
positive approach on what institutional settings have been shown empirically to be 
conducive to growth. Thus, with this assumption, the empirical agenda becomes 
focused on the possible reasons for the lack of emergence of such institutions and the 
related question of explaining the persistence of inefficient institutions. The most 
comprehensive summary of recent literature, including the authors own contributions, is 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005), on which the following short survey is based.   
Fundamental and proximate causes for growth 
Institutions were famously described by Douglass North (1990) as the “rules of 
the game in a society…that shape human interaction” which therefore “structure 
                                                          
4
 Acemoglu et al., 2002 and 2005. 
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incentives in human exchange”. This approach emphasizes institutions as the 
fundamental cause for explaining differences in growth levels and rates across 
countries, which precede proximate causes, such as accumulation of capital (Solow, 
1956), technological innovation (Romer, 1986) and human capital (Lucas, 1988). The 
idea is that even if one accepts the importance of these latter causes, there still remains 
the question of why some countries invest more in these factors
5
.  
Three contending fundamental causes for growth are geography, culture and 
institutions. All three have long traditions
6
, but the case for the prominence of 
institutions has been recently advanced through a methodological approach focused on 
natural experiments of history
7
 – the identification of specific historical situations that 
can be assumed to be exogenous and thus serve as instrumental variables, overcoming 
identification problems like reverse causation or omitted variable bias. A classic 
example is the case of the two Koreas, which share a common history, geography and 
culture but diverged dramatically in their political and economic institutions after the II 
World War. Regarding what are the specific institutions that seem to be more conducive 
to growth, Acemoglu et al., in the same article, present compelling evidence for the 
paramount importance of private property, of a broad-base access to the resources of the 
economy and the effective enforcement of contracts
8
.         
 
 
                                                          
5
 Fundamental may also be interpreted as long-run factors, in that policy actions can be determinant for 
growth but institutions or geography can be a constraining or an augmenting factor in the long-run.  
6
 See Rodrik et al. (2002) and Sachs (2001) for two important voices in the debate.  
7
 See Diamond and Robinson (2010)  
8
 For a more cautious endorsement of the importance of institutions, which also surveys the debate, see 
Subramanian and Roy (2001); Henry and Miller (2008), question the centrality of institutions by 
analyzing the case of Barbados and Jamaica, but in our view fail in their attempt to extricate institutions 
from their explanations of growth divergence. 
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Institutional Choice 
But the question then becomes: why don’t societies choose those institutions that have 
been persuasively shown to be conducive to growth? Again, multiple contributions from 
public choice theory
9
 help illuminate the inherent conflict in the political allocation of 
scarce resources of society as well as the way in which political and economic elites 
have both the motive and the means to create institutions that maximize their rents. This 
equilibrium situation may account for the stability and permanence of institutions which 
are clearly detrimental to overall societal welfare and economic growth. 
Mechanisms of persistence and change 
Acemoglu et al., in the referred article, lay out the main challenges in the 
research agenda on the role of institutions for growth. As they point out “we do not as 
yet have a satisfactory understanding of the mechanisms through which institutions 
persist” (p. 79) and both persistence and change in institutions “have to be analyzed as 
part of the same dynamic equilibrium framework”. The conceptual framework 
developed in this Work Project very consciously seeks to address this challenge by 
digging down on specific intra-institutional dynamics (or mechanisms) that may explain 
institutional stagnation in a fundamental institution in society – the judicial.   
Legal origin theory and the centrality of the judicial 
A focus on the judicial is intuitively appealing, as it affects a multitude of other 
institutions in society and its impact spans abstract but vital issues, such as the 
legitimacy of the State, public order and fairness, to more practical but still crucial 
aspects, like the enforcement of contracts and the protection of private property
10
.  
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 See Mueller (2003) for example. 
10
 See for example Messick (1999) and Beck et al. (2003).  
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Because reform efforts in general have substantial social and political costs, an 
optimizing strategy may be one that focuses on the most impactful institutions. Tavares 
(2004) constructs a set of indices that measure the impact on growth, costs and 
efficiency of various possible reform efforts for a broad cross-section of countries. The 
author shows that, for Portugal, six of the ten most promising reforms are in the legal 
area, with positive outcomes at the aggregate and micro levels.           
In the last decade a vast amount of work has been carried out around the theory 
that legal origin, the type of law system, civil or common, that a country has, is an 
important explanatory variable for various economic outcomes, and that systems 
originating in common law, by being more favorable to private property, among other 
aspects, may be more conducive to growth when compared with civil law systems. The 
most comprehensive overview is La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008). These 
authors also address the issue of persistence of legal origins – the fact that there does 
not appear to be a convergence of legal systems over time, especially in the aspects of 
civil law that have been shown to hinder positive economic outcomes. They say that: 
“the central point is that the reason for persistence is that the beliefs and ideologies 
become incorporated in legal rules, institutions and education and, as such, are 
transmitted from one generation to the next” (p. 308). This is an unsatisfactory and 
somewhat tautological explanation. It fails to consider the possibility of interest groups 
and of conflicts of interest. The judicial is a crucial institution for the allocation of 
scarce resources in society, and, historically, it has been at the centre of structural 
realignments of power and even revolutions. It is doubtful that such an institution would 
be allowed to develop in a neutral form over time. This work project gains much of its 
interest from the fact that it offers and tests a completely different interpretation for the 
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persistence of legal systems, which, to the best of our knowledge, is absent in this 
literature. The alternative hypothesis here explored is that the persistence may be 
explained by the fact that certain professional bodies within the judicial have strong 
incentives to maintain the status quo and also the means to act on this motivation. Even 
if we assume that legal origin is exogenous, due to historical circumstances and colonial 
legacy, mostly external to the country at hand, its persistence and specific rules 
materialize in response to local interests and political factors.      
3. A Thought Experiment: Quantifying interests in the Judicial Arena 
In exploring the judicial system, I opted for the use of thought experiment. This 
approach has a long tradition in the humanities (for example, Hobbes and Locke’s use 
of the “state of nature”). Basically, a thought experiment is a model in the sense that it is 
purposely designed to test a certain hypothesis under a number of precisely defined 
assumptions. But in my view this term better encapsulates the fact that the devised 
situation does not necessarily need to occur (or even be feasible or empirically testable) 
for it to be theoretically useful. This is exemplified by what is arguably the most famous 
20
th
 century thought experiment, Rawls’s veil of ignorance – a clear situation in which 
an impossible situation (a choice under complete ignorance) is useful in illustrating a 
rational outcome under certain assumptions. In my thought experiment I explore the 
likely outcome of a hypothetical situation in which judges and lawyers are, 
independently, the sole decision makers determining the level of procedural formalism 
of the judicial system
11
.  
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 Different versions of this exercise could grow to incorporate other relevant groups, such as policy-
makers, judicial bureaucrats or public prosecutors (in criminal cases). But lawyers and judges were 
chosen because they encapsulate a central relationship at the heart of the judicial; what one learns from 
this relationship can potentially be adapted to other interactions within the judicial. 
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The foundation for this thought experiment is the work of Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2003). It is from their paper that I obtain the raw data 
and indicators that are then developed and interpreted in a novel way in order to obtain, 
for the first time, a quantification of the preferences of different groups in the judicial. 
Based on rigorous comparative surveys on the procedures required for two simple but 
representative judicial cases, the authors develop indexes of formalism, finding that: 
 As expected, common law countries (originating in English Law) are less 
formalistic than civil law countries (originating in Roman law)
12
; 
 Formalism is directly correlated with duration of the cases, a major variable 
of judicial quality, with strong implications for private contracts and hence 
economic performance, and inversely correlated with self-reported 
perceptions of quality of the system; 
 Even when compared with other measure to reduce durations, such as the 
introduction of specific incentive, formalism remains the most powerful 
predictor of duration of a judicial cases; 
 When compared with indicators of educational performance or GDP, the 
type of law system (common or civil) is the most powerful explanatory 
cause for cross-country differences in levels of procedural formalism. 
 
This last issue highlights the usefulness of this research agenda in the analysis of 
economic growth. Drawing on the results of Djankov et al., and subsequent work
13
, it 
then appears that a move from a more formalistic to a less formalistic system positively 
affects a very concrete indicator of judicial performance, the duration of cases. 
Although there are other measures of judicial quality and it can be argued that fairness 
or minimization of errors may be traded-off on higher speed (although note the cited 
inverse relation between formalism and self-reported measures of quality), a basic 
tenant of a legal system is that “justice delayed is justice denied”. Furthermore, high 
average duration of cases is associated with negative economic outcomes, impacting, 
for example, the enforcement of contracts and level of entrepreneurship, through the 
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 See appendix II for a break-down of civil law and common law countries. 
13
 See La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008) for an in-depth discussion of the available evidence 
linking legal origin and economic growth and the negative effect associated with civil law systems. 
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increase in the cost of defaults, by raising transaction costs and by excluding potential 
gains from trade.   
Thus, a policy decision on the level of formalism may affect growth 
performance. This begs the following question: since higher formalism is associated 
with higher time-costs, lower quality and negative economic outcomes, which affect 
society as a whole, why don’t high-formalism countries engage in reforms that reduce 
procedures? This relates this issue to the larger question of institutional persistence. As 
cited above, the authors invoke inertia and ideology as the explanation for persistence, 
but we explore the alternative hypothesis of an inherent conflict between judges and 
lawyers originating from divergent preferences regarding level of formalism.  
The thought experiment can be laid out in the following terms:   
 Judges, as a group, are given the absolute power to decide on the level of 
formalism in their country; they are offered the Djankov et al. menu of 31 
types of procedures to which they have to attribute a value of 0, if they do 
not want that specific procedure, 0.5 if they are indifferent or ambiguous 
about it, and 1 if they want it. By adding and normalizing all these individual 
choices they end up with their overall preferred level of procedural 
formalism, which is then implemented in society; 
 Likewise for lawyers; 
 
This exercise potentially illuminates some interesting questions: what level of 
formalism would each profession end up choosing? How does the chosen level of 
formalism of one profession compare with that of the other? To what degree does each 
choice deviate from the actual level of formalism in the country and how the magnitude 
of this deviation is suggestive of potential resistance or support for reform? 
Methodologically, for each of the 31 binary variables developed by Djankov et 
al. (which generate seven procedural indexes that then form the overall formalism index 
for each country), I attributed a value that expresses the reasonable preference of the 
lawyers and of the judges. The only assumption is that, on average, members of the 
12 
 
profession will follow their self-interest – in line the methodological individualism 
adopted in economics, other things being equal, lawyers and judges will tend to choose 
procedures that maximize their income, job security, political power and prestige and 
resist those that affect these. As it will become clear in the results section, for most of 
these indicators, the reasonability of the preference is clear-cut (that is, it has a value of 
0 or 1). For some, the preferences may be more ambiguous, either to one of the 
professions or to both. All cases were discussed with judicial professionals
14
 in 
thorough, anonymous interviews, which were instrumental in clarifying some of the 
issues. When compelling doubts were raised regarding preferences on a given 
dimension, then that indicator was subjected to a different quantitative treatment. Apart 
from a number of strategies to increase the robustness of the model, which will be 
presented below, readers can evaluate all the assumptions which are laid out in detail in 
appendix I.  
An example of an indicator that seems to be clear-cut both for judges and 
lawyers is “Judgment must be on law (not on equity)”, in which the value is one if it 
must be on law and zero if it can be based on equity concerns (less formal). It is 
reasonable to suppose that most judges would prefer to have the added power that 
comes from the ability to exert their personal judgment above and beyond the 
constraints of written law. Inversely, lawyers will tend to benefit from having the law as 
a constraining bind on the judges – it means their role is more important and that 
outcomes are more predictable. Furthermore, this obligation generates a premium on 
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 I believe a survey would be problematic for two main reasons: 1) asking general questions on 
preferences for formality in a spectrum would probably result in centrist or moderate formulaic positions; 
but if the question was focused on a specific measures for reduction of formality, then it would be 
difficult to ascertain if the response reflects a general attitude regarding preferences for level of formalism 
or just an assessment of that specific measure. 2) A survey that intends to measure self-interested 
behavior is likely to be recognized as such, thus eliciting strategic responses which pervert the quality of 
the answers.      
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their particular skill-set, namely knowledge of written law. An example of an indicator 
that is clear cut for lawyers but not judges is “legal representation is mandatory” (1 if 
mandatory, 0 if not). It is almost self-evident that lawyers would prefer a system where 
the hiring of lawyers is mandatory. But for judges it is a more ambiguous question. On 
the one hand, by not facing lawyers their power and responsibility is greater since there 
is an implied recognition of their capacity to independently assess the merits of a case; 
on the other hand, the existence of a lawyer may facilitate the judgment by framing the 
issue in legal terms. These types of indicators were treated as ambiguous, irrespectively 
of any personal opinions regarding which of the two effects dominates. Other indicators 
were treated as ambiguous because they seem to affect lawyers and judges only 
indirectly or not at all (for example, “notification by judgment by judicial officer 
required”). We also produced a more stringent set of results, which constitutes a 
robustness test on the classification procedure. It starts from the reasonable preference 
attributed to those less obvious variables and gives them the opposite value – if on the 
first approach the preference of, say, judges were zero, then it becomes one. This is a 
strong demand as it entails that, for those variables, the assumed preference was 
diametrically wrong. As it will be clear in the next section, this increase in the demands 
placed on the model does not affect the overall results and conclusions, and this is 
important in a model that despite being founded on basic self-interest, depends on 
assumed, not revealed, preferences.  
4. Results
15
 
Analyzing each of the 31 indicators of procedural formalism from the 
perspective of lawyers and of judges, it becomes clear that, for most indicators, each 
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 The assumptions are discussed in appendix I and the results can be viewed on interactive charts at the 
address: www.persistenceinefficiency.tumblr.com  
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profession would not be indifferent to its specific level. That is, for most of the 
indicators, one can reasonably expect that the average lawyer would prefer one level 
(say 1) and the judge would prefer the opposite (say 0). This can then be compared with 
the actual level observed for a given country, which is either 1 or 0 and, as mentioned 
above, was collected from Djankov et al. (2003). Adding up those various preferences, 
interesting regularities immediately stand out. 
Table I: Preferences of Judges and Lawyers regarding level of formalism 
VARIABLES Preferences 
Clear-cut 
Preferences
Ambiguous 
Preferences
Preferences  
considering 
ambiguity
Preferences 
with 
Robustness 
Test
Preferences 
Clear-cut 
Preferences
Ambiguous 
Preferences
Preferences  
considering 
ambiguity
Preferences 
with 
Robustness 
Test
1. Professionals versus Laymen
1.1 General Jurisdiction Court 1 √ 0,5 0 1 √ 0,5 0
1.2 Professional vs. Non-professional 1 √ 1 1 0 √ 0,5 1
1.3 Legal Representation mandatory 0 √ 0,5 1 1 √ 1 1
Index 0,6667 0,6667 0,6667 0,6667 0,6667 0,6667
2. Written versus Oral
2.1 Filling 0 √ 0 0 1 √ 1 1
2.2 Service of Process 0 √ 0 0 1 √ 1 1
2.3 Opposition 0 √ 0 0 1 √ 1 1
2.4 Evidence 0 √ 0 0 1 √ 1 1
2.5 Final Arguments 0 √ 0 0 1 √ 1 1
2.6 Judgment 0 √ 0 0 1 √ 1 1
2.7 Notification of Judgement 0 √ 0,5 1 1 √ 0,5 0
2.8 Enforcement of Judgement 0 √ 0,5 1 1 √ 0,5 0
Index 0 0,125 0,25 1 0,875 0,75
3. Legal Justification
3.1 Complaint must be legally justified 0 √ 0 0 1 √ 1 1
3.2 Judgment must be legally justified 0 √ 0 0 1 √ 1 1
3.3 Judgment must be on law (not equity) 0 √ 0 0 1 √ 1 1
Index 0 0 0 1 1 1
4. Statutory Regulation of Evidence
4.1 Judge can not introduce evidence 0 √ 0 0 1 √ 1 1
4.2 Judge can not reject irrelevant evidence 0 √ 0 0 1 √ 1 1
4.3 Out-of-court statements are inadmissible 0 √ 0 0 1 √ 1 1
4.4 Mandatory pre-qualification of questions 1 √ 1 1 0 √ 0 0
4.5 Oral interrogation only by judge 1 √ 1 1 0 √ 0 0
4.6 Only original documents and certified copies are admissible 0 √ 0,5 1 0 √ 0,5 1
4.7 Authenticity and weight of evidence defined by law 0 √ 0 0 1 √ 1 1
4.8 Mandatory recording of evidence 0 √ 0,5 1 1 √ 0,5 0
Index 0,25 0,375 0,5 0,625 0,625 0,625
5. Control of Superior Review
5.1 Enforcement of judgment is automatically suspended until resolution of the appeal.0 √ 0 0 1 √ 1 1
5.2 Comprehensive review in appeal 0 √ 0 0 1 √ 1 1
5.3 Interlocutory appeals are allowed 0 √ 0 0 1 √ 1 1
Index 0 0 0 1 1 1
6. Engament Formalities
6.1 Mandatory pre-trial conciliation 0 √ 0,5 1 0 √ 0,5 1
6.2 Service of process by judicial officer required 0 √ 0,5 1 1 √ 0,5 0
6.3 Notification of judgment by judicial officer required 0 √ 0,5 1 1 √ 0,5 0
Index 0 0,5 1 0,6667 0,5 0,3333
7. Independent procedural actions
7.1 Filing and Service less √ more √
7.2 Trial and Judgment less √ more √
7.3 Enforcement less √ more √
Index 0,3035 0,3035 0,3035 0,4553 0,4553 0,4553
Preferences Index 1,2202 1,9702 2,7202 5,4136 5,1219 4,8303
PREFERENCES
Judges Lawyers
 
Note: See Appendix I for detailed description of variables and rationale for decisions on preferences; the column 
“preferences considering ambiguity” attributes a value of 0.5 to variables in which preferences may be ambiguous; 
the column “preferences with robustness test” attributes to those ambiguous preferences the opposite value of the 
initially assumed preference, in order to see the impact of possible errors in the assumptions; as the last row shows, 
the uncovered divergence among judges and lawyers holds on all three sets of results, spanning from 1.22 to 2.7 in 
the case of judges and 5.4 and 4.8 in the case of lawyers. This large gap increases our confidence in the model.       
 
15 
 
Of the three sets of results obtained, in what follows we will use the numbers 
laid out in the column “Preferences considering ambiguity”, although conclusions hold 
across the three sets (only varying in magnitude): 
A) There is indeed a marked divergence of preferences on most dimensions. It 
could be otherwise, a coincidence of preferences between the two even if 
divergent from the actual level of the country. This opens to ground for intra-
professional conflict and zero-sum dynamics. On 21 of the 31 indicators, the 
modeled preferences are divergent;  
B) Those divergent preferences are consistent in their signal – when added up 
they generate composite indexes showing radically divergent points in the 
procedural formalism spectrum. Again this could be otherwise, as a preference 
of 1 by, say, lawyers on one dimension could cancel out a preference of 0 also 
by lawyers). For judges, 19 of the 31, and for lawyers 20 of the 31, indicators go 
in the same direction or signal;   
C) The results clearly show a marked trend for lawyers to prefer very high levels 
of formalism and for judges to prefer very low levels of formalisms. According 
to the model, if lawyers could choose the level of procedural formalism they 
would opt for a value of 5.41 (in a 0-7 index) whereas judges would choose a 
level of 1.97. The choice of lawyers is above the actual levels of formalism of 
103 of the 109 country sample, for eviction of a tenant, and above the level of 
102 of the 109 countries, in the case of collection of a check; the choice of 
judges is below the level of 106 of the 109 countries, in the case of eviction of a 
tenant, and below the level of 100 of the 109 countries in the case of collection 
of a check.  
D) When contrasted with the actual levels of formalism in each of the countries, 
and as expected considering the systematic higher formalism and the preference 
of lawyers towards higher formalism, it becomes clear that civil law countries 
are much closer to the preferences of lawyers – much more favorable to their 
interests – and that common law exhibit levels of formalism closer to the ones 
that judges would reasonably choose. In the case of an eviction of a non-paying 
tenant, the modeled preferences of judges deviates -1.05, and lawyers 2.10, from 
the actual mean formalism index in English origin common law; judges’ 
preferences deviate -2.41 and lawyers’ preferences 0.74 from the mean of 
French origin countries. This suggests that the marked differences between 
common and civil systems that have been amply identified in the literature can 
be expressed as the materialization of a clear-cut and acute conflict of interest 
among judges and lawyers. 
 
These clear results demonstrate the informative nature of the thought 
experiment. By showing a marked divergence of preferences, these results are indicative 
of a clear conflict of interests and of zero-sum dynamics within the judiciary; by 
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showing a consistent preference of judges and lawyers for opposing and extreme levels 
of formalism, the results may explain the incentives for persistence of formalism; and 
by being closely aligned with a crucial aspect in the division between common and civil 
law, namely the level of formalism, results raise the possibility that the conflict among 
judges and lawyers may be an unaccounted for factor driving or maintaining the divide.    
The following charts, using data for eviction of tenants in Portugal and the 
modeled preferences, show in more detail the drivers of this divergence. This may be 
important to ascertain what should be the focus of an eventual reform towards a 
reduction of formalism. As it is clear, (chart I) lawyers’s preferences are mostly aligned 
with the actual level of formalism for each of the sub-indicators (a perfect fit would be 
all points placed in the 45
o
 line), whereas in the case of judges (chart II) we can clearly 
see that in three dimensions – “Superior Review”, “Legal Justification” and “Oral-
Written” – actual procedures diverge from the modeled preferences of judges.   
Chart I: Preferences of lawyers vs. actual level in eviction of tenant, Portugal 
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Chart II: Preferences of judges vs. actual level in eviction of tenant, Portugal 
 
We also subtracted the actual level of formalism in each country (drawn from 
Djankov et al., 2003) to the modeled preference of judges and lawyers, as computed in 
this study, assuming that the uncovered preferences hold across countries, and obtained 
the following plot.  
Chart III: Deviations from preferences of judges and lawyers, eviction of tenant, all countries 
  
The x-axis measures the difference between the actual level of formalism in the 
country and the modeled preference of the Judges; the y-axis measures the difference 
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between the actual level of formalism in the country and the modeled preferences of the 
lawyers. A country above the 45
0
 line is tilted towards judges – meaning that the actual 
level of formalism is closer to the one that a Judge would reasonably choose for his/her 
country if he/she were the decision-maker. A country in the lower-right corner is tilted 
towards lawyers – the actual level of formalism is closer to lawyers’ preferences. A 
country on top of the 45
0
 line is equidistant between lawyers’ and judges’ preferences. 
The few countries below zero are those whose actual levels of formalism are either 
lower or greater than the preferences of judges and lawyers respectively. The plot also 
clearly shows a divide on legal origin. The overwhelming majority of common law 
countries are closer to the preferences of judges whereas civil law countries are closer to 
the preferences of lawyers. This is an expected result once we accept that lawyers favor 
formalism (the current thought experiment) and that civil law countries tend to be more 
formal (Djankov et al, 2003). We can see, for example, that Belize’s level of formalism 
is almost exactly aligned with the modeled preferences of judges, whereas in Panama, 
there is a striking distance between the actual level and the preferences of judges.  On 
the other hand, we observe that Mozambique’s system seems to be perfectly aligned 
with the preferences of lawyers, whereas New Zealand is the country furthest from the 
interests of lawyers.  We also observe that Portugal’s level of formalism only 0.58 from 
the modeled preferences of lawyers, but deviates 2.57 from the preferences of judges, a 
greater distance than the mean of the French origin countries.  
Finally, we use data on average GDP growth between 1960 and 2007, and the 
average Gini coefficient for the countries involved and explore the explanatory value 
that the deviation from lawyers
16
, controlling for the initial level of GDP in 1960, and a 
                                                          
16
 Equivalent to using the deviation from judges, since the two variables are exactly symmetric. 
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dummy for legal origin. The sub-sample for which all data is available is composed of 
68 countries. Results are laid out in table II. As can be verified, the more a country’s 
judicial system is classified as deviating from the preferences of lawyers (and thus, 
closer to preferences of judges), the larger the average growth rate and the lower the 
Gini coefficient. The coefficient on Gini is highly significant, while that on growth is 
not significant. These results might be due to an omitted variable bias, as lawyers, who 
display a marked preference for formalism, are in line with the characteristics of civil 
law systems. There is a well established correlation between civil law origin and a 
number of negative economic outcomes (La Porta et al., 2008), which fits the intuition 
that this system tends to be less favorable towards private initiative and the enforcement 
of contracts. But even the defenders of legal origin theory state that there could be an 
omitted variable that explains both legal origin and growth or a reverse causation. In 
columns 3 and 4 we add a dummy for civil law system and find that our results are 
reinforced: the coefficient of deviation from lawyers’s preferences on the Gini remains 
positive and significant and is now larger in size; the same coefficient on the growth 
regression remains positive and its significance is marginally increased. The dummy on 
civil law systems shows that these are significantly associated with more unequal 
societies. We then run the same specifications for the sub-samples of civil law and 
common law countries and find that the results for inequality hold within legal systems. 
In other words, the individual system’s deviation from lawyers’s preferences is 
significantly associated with a lower degree of inequality. The results diverge as to the 
impact of deviation from lawyers’s preferences on economic growth. Our evidence 
suggests that, while on common law systems, the deviation from lawyers’s preferences 
20 
 
is associated with lower growth; the opposite is true for civil law systems.
17
 That is, 
while moving away from lawyers preferences lowers inequality and increases growth in 
civil law countries, there is a trade-off in common law countries, so that moving further 
away from lawyers preferences may have a growth cost, though decreasing income 
inequality. This may be explained by the already higher levels of deviation from lawyer 
preferences in common law countries
18
.   
 Dependent Variables 
 All Countries Only Common Law Only Civil law 
Independent 
Variables 
Growth 
Rate Gini Index 
Growth 
Rate Gini Index 
Growth 
Rate Gini Index 
Growth 
Rate Gini Index 
Log GDP per 
capita 1960 
(t-statistic) 
0.000112 
(0.081262) 
 
-2.210199 
(-3-019071) 
 
-0.000156 
(-0.104218) 
-1.518451 
(-1.984765) 
0.004560 
(1.827392) 
-0.092653 
(-0.076431) 
-0.001822 
(-1.153604) 
-3.456016 
(-3.820812) 
Deviation 
from Lawyers 
(t-statistic) 
0.002367 
(1.1192573) 
-4.211285 
(-3.901724) 
0.003149 
(1.221871) 
-6.256176 
(-4.615409) 
-0.012798 
(-2.403414) 
-3.070032 
(-1.114245) 
0.008825 
(3.744664) 
-7.748585 
(-5.691037) 
Common 
Law Dummy 
(t-statistic) 
- - 
-0.002483 
(-0.480041) 
6.422593 
(2.357784) 
- - - - 
N 68 68 68 68 26 26 42 42 
R2 0.02 0.31 0.27 0.61 0.21 0.08 0.27 0.61 
 
5. Implications for Policy Reform 
Implications of the obtained results for understanding persistence of inefficiency 
If lawyers are better-off in civil law systems they have an incentive to maintain 
this type of law, to resist efforts to reduce formalism and even promote higher 
formalism. Depending on their effectiveness in lobbying the executive or legislator, this 
means that in civil law countries that higher formalism will persist, decrease slowly or 
even increase over time. This may generate a dynamic equilibrium at an inefficient 
level, which fits Acemoglu et al (2005) social conflict view account of the emergence 
and persistence of inefficient institutions – the inherent conflict between lawyers’s and 
                                                          
17
 This may be behind the non-significance of deviation from lawyers’s preferences on growth in the total 
sample, as shown in columns 1 to 4 of Table II. 
18
 Notice also the quantitatively larger coefficient on deviation from lawyers’s preferences in the case of 
civil law countries. 
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judges’s preferences and between the preferences of lawyer’s and those of society, may 
be the mechanism accounting for institutional stasis.   
However, in order to account for the persistence, we not only need to establish a 
motive, but also the means. Lawyers can only be part of the explanation for this 
persistence of civil law systems if they have the mechanisms for translating their 
preference for formalism into the actual level defined by the legislator or executive. 
Although this issue would probably merit a whole project in itself, for this purpose it 
may suffice to point out that in most countries lawyers tend to be a dominant force in 
political elites and thus prominent in the legislative process
19
, whereas judges typically 
have limitations in running for political office. In Portugal, for example, throughout the 
20
th
 century, lawyers have been the single most represented profession in the executive, 
parliament and senior civil service (Costa Pinto and Freire, 2003). However, an 
explanation of this sort also has to explain why in common law countries lawyers have 
been mostly unable to increase formalism, as this theory would predict. A possible 
solution: because civil law systems are far more dependent on legislation and codes, 
lawyers-legislators in civil law countries find it easier to steer the system in accordance 
with their preferences.   
Finally, it is important to note that even though lawyers seem to have a marked 
preference for formalism – they gain from it, whereas society as a whole seems to lose 
from it – this does not necessarily mean that their primary motivation is rent-seeking. 
Judges have special statutes that rightly ensure their independence but which may result 
in low accountability. If in a given country there are insufficient internal and external 
reviews, then it can be rational for lawyers to prefer higher levels of formalism, which 
                                                          
19
 A classic article on the overrepresentation of lawyers in the public sphere is Schlesinger (1957). 
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serves as an insurance against an eventual incompetence of a judge. For example, some 
simple cases are subject to appeal in civil law countries but not in common law 
countries – although an appeal increases formalism and duration of cases, it may be an 
effective escape-valve in a system with low accountability of judges, as lawyers know 
there will be an opportunity of facing a different, superior, judge.     
Implications of the obtained results for reform efforts    
If we accept the intrinsic divergence of preferences for formalism among 
lawyers and judges, then a reform effort towards reduced formalism (which seem to 
contribute to overall welfare) will face resistance from lawyers but may be backed by 
judges. Starting from a realistic position of inherent conflict of interests, two possible 
paths for reform arise (which may actually work better when combined):  
A piecemeal approach focuses on each of the seven indicators of procedural 
formalism (charts I and II above), observes its current value in the country and its 
deviation from the modeled preferences of both judges and lawyers. This gives an 
indication of what are the specific measures more likely to be resisted or supported by 
each profession. The reformer will have a better sense of the level of specific resistance 
or support to be expected. For example, in the referred charts above, it is easy to 
observe that in Portugal the specific indicators driving most of the divergence from the 
preferences of the judges are “legal justification” and “superior review”. Potentially, 
although difficult in practice, there could even be efficient bargaining situations in 
which all parties would be better off or at least lose in equal proportions so as to achieve 
a dynamic equilibrium at a more efficient level of formalism. It is important to note, 
however, that this model gives an indication of what is driving most of the deviation 
from each profession’s preference, not which indicators contribute more to the positive 
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economic outcomes associated with a reduction of formalism. Such knowledge would 
make these bargaining possibilities far more promising.  
A comprehensive approach involves a larger reform package. The inter-play 
between judges and lawyers may be instrumental in generating institutional change. The 
zero-sum dynamics among the two professions and the fact that lawyers seem to be 
disproportionally affected, and judges disproportionally benefited, by a reduction of 
formalism, suggests not only the potential support of judges but also opens the ground 
for compensatory measures to offset these gains and losses. Thus, invoking again the 
issue of formalism and the accountability of judges, perhaps the introduction of a 
reform package that matches a reduction of formalism (to the detriment of lawyers and 
benefit of judges) with an increase in the accountability of judges through the 
introduction of external reviews (to the detriment of judges and benefit of lawyers) may 
be more readily accepted by lawyers when compared with an alternative that only 
includes a reduction of formalism. 
6. Conclusions 
The goal of this work project was to draw attention to intra-professional conflict 
as a conceptually useful dimension towards understanding institutional persistence and 
change. Starting from a large number of indicators of procedural formalism, and 
reasonable expectations regarding self-interested preferences, we were able to show that 
there is indeed a wide gap in the preferences among judges and of lawyers, with the 
former having a marked preference for low, and the latter for high, levels of formalism. 
These results are striking and hold when assumptions are more stringent. Lawyers’s 
preferences for formalism, if effectively translated into legislation, may account for the 
fact that several countries maintain high levels of formalism, despite evidence of its 
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collective costs. But the thorough understanding of the nature of this conflict also opens 
the door to a more realistic approach to legal reform – one which better anticipates 
sources of resistance but also of support, and engages in negotiations with a better sense 
of the gains and losses involved.  
      
*** 
 
 
The inherent complexity of institutions limits their smooth migration from one 
country to another, limiting potentially interesting “institutional transfers”
20
 and policy 
advice from international agencies. Thus, institutional change towards a more conducive 
environment for growth and welfare will likely have to generate from within a country. 
To enable change – and this applies both to developing and developed countries – it is 
therefore crucial to understand the mechanisms that lead both to persistence and to 
change in institutions. I believe the results obtained in this work project suggest the 
usefulness of digging-down into the intra-professional conflicts of interest within 
institutions. This exercise helps us understand institutional persistence and illuminate 
paths for reform. A potentially promising research agenda focused in policy 
recommendations would thus (1) identify and then focus on the most impactful 
inefficient institutions
21
, (2) analyze and test the contending explanations for their 
inefficiency, and (3) evaluate the internal and external dynamics at play as well as the 
various conflicting interests and motivations involved.  
 
 
                                                          
20
 In this context Rodrik (2008) proposes an approach focused on “second-best institutions”, potentially 
more adapted to local realities.     
21
 Following the methodology of Tavares (2004), for example. 
25 
 
REFERENCES 
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. 2002. “Reversal of Fortune: Geography 
and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 118, 1231-1294. 
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. 2005. “Institutions as the Fundamental 
Cause of Long-Run Growth.” In Handbook of Economic Growth, edited by Philippe Aghion and 
Steven Durlauf, Volume 1, Part 1, 385-472. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
Beck, Thorsten, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine. 2003. “Law and Finance: why does Legal 
Origin Matter?” Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 31:4, 653-675.  
Coase, Ronald H. 1937. “The Nature of the Firm.” Economica, 3, 386-405.  
Costa Pinto, António, and André Freire (ed.). 2003. Elites, Sociedade e Mudança Política. Oeiras: 
Celta.  
Diamond, Jared, and James A. Robinson. 2010. Natural Experiments of History. Cambridge: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
Djankov, Simeon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. 2003. 
“Courts.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, Vol. 118(2), 453-517. 
Garcia, Sofia Amaral, Nuno Garoupa, and Guilherme Vasconcelos Vilaça. 2008. A Justiça Cível 
em Portugal: uma Perspectiva Quantitativa. Lisboa: Fundação Luso-Americana para o 
Desenvolvimento. 
Garoupa, Nuno. 2006. “Economia da Reforma da Justiça.” Scientia Jurídica, Tomo LV: 305.  
Hayek, Friederich A. 1960. The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Henry, Peter B., and Conrad Miller. 2008. “Institutions Vs. Policies: A Tale of Two Islands.” 
NBER Working Paper Series 14604.    
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. 2008. “The Economic 
Consequences of Legal Origins.” Journal of Economic Literature, 46:2, 285-332. 
Lucas, Robert E. 1988. “On the Mechanics of Economic Development.” Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 22, 3-42. 
Machiavelli, Niccolo. 2005. The Prince. Oxford: Oxford University Press, (Orig. pub. 1532) 
Messick, Richard E. 1999. “Judicial Reform and Economic Development: a Survey of the Issues.” 
The World Bank Research Observer 14(1): 117-136. 
Mueller, Dennis C. 2003. Public Choice III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
North, Douglass. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. New York: 
Cambridge University Press.   
Olson, Mancur. 1982. The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation and 
Economic Rigidities. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.   
Popper, Karl. 2002. The Open Society and its Enemies. London: Routledge, (Orig. pub. 1945). 
Rawls, John. 1999. A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, (Orig. pub. 1971). 
Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi. 2002. “Institutions Rule: The 
Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development”. NBER Workin 
Paper Series 9305.    
Rodrik, Dani. 2008. “Second-best Institutions.” NBER Working Paper Series 14050. 
Romer, Paul M. 1986. “Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth.” Journal of Political Economy, 
94, 1002-1037.  
Sachs, Jeffrey. 2001. “Tropical Underdevelopment”. NBER Working Paper Series w8119.  
Schlesinger, Joseph A. 1957, “Lawyers and American Politics: A Clarified View.” Midwest Journal 
of Political Science, Vol. 1:1, 26-39 
Smith, Adam. 1999. The Wealth of Nations. London: Penguin Books, (Orig. pub. 1776). 
Solow, Robert M. “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 70, 65-94.  
Subramanian, Arvind and Devesh Roy. 2001. "Who Can Explain the Mauritian Miracle: Meade, 
Romer, Sachs, or Rodrik?" IMF Working Papers 01/116. 
Tavares, José. 2004. “Institutions and Economic Growth in Portugal: a Quantitative Exploration.” 
Portuguese Economic Journal, 3, 49-79.  
Tullock, Gordon. 1967. “The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft.” Western Economic 
Journal 5 (3): 224–232. 
26 
 
Appendix I: Description of variables and choices of preferences 
Djankov et al. (2003) includes a detailed description of the 31 indicators of procedural 
formalism developed by the authors. What follows is a brief description of the variables and of 
the reasoning behind each decision regarding preferences of judges and lawyers (which are laid 
out in Table I). These indicators were discussed with judicial professional (see the main text for 
a discussion of the strategies for increasing robustness of results). A value of zero means less, 
and of one, more formalism. 
 
PROFESSIONAL VERSUS LAYMEN 
 
 General Jurisdiction Court (zero if limited court, one if general court) 
o Whether the case has can be heard by a specialized, limited court, like a small debt 
collection or housing courts, small-claims courts, arbitrators or justices of the peace; I 
believe preferences on this indicator are ambiguous both for judges and lawyers. On the 
one hand these types of limited courts may turn the judicial operation into a semi-
administrative function and may even remove judges and lawyers from the case, but on 
the other hand, their existence may liberate general courts from small claims and may 
thus decrease bureaucratic burden of judges (which can focus on more challenging 
case), and lawyers may have some role even in these limited courts.  
 Professional vs. non professional (zero for a non-professional judge, one for a 
professional) 
o This variable measures whether the judge has to be professional. I assume that judges 
un-ambiguously prefer the requirement of a professional judge, thus choosing one (an 
administrative downgrade of judgments affect the prestige of the profession and its 
professional monopoly); I believe preferences of lawyers are ambiguous: a mostly 
administrative process may reduce incentive of parties to hire lawyers but it may also 
raise the profile of the lawyer; also, if the case only requires an arbitrator, a role usually 
done by certified lawyers, this creates employment opportunities.  
 Legal representation is mandatory (zero when non-mandatory, one when mandatory) 
o Measures whether the law imposed the hiring of a lawyer; I assume that lawyers will 
have a clear preference for this imposition; judges’s decisions are more ambiguous: on 
the one hand they have a more central role if they are the only judicial profession in a 
case and have more discretion, but facing a lawyer, trained in legal argument, may 
facilitate the proceedings. 
 
 
 
ORAL-WRITTEN 
 
 Filling (one if in written form; zero if presented orally) 
 Service of process (one if in written form; zero if presented orally) 
 Opposition (one if in written form; zero if presented orally) 
 Evidence (one if written form; zero if presented orally) 
 Final argument (one if in written form; zero if presented orally) 
 Judgment (one if in written form; zero if presented orally) 
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o These six variables address the paper-work requirements. I assume that judges will 
prefer an oral presentation because it gives them a more central role in the proceedings 
– judges listen to the issues directly from the parties; lawyers will prefer written form: 
they are able to frame the issues in accordance with their interests, facilitating the 
steering of the case; also lawyers become more valuable in the process since the written 
pieces require legal knowledge.  
 
 Notification of judgment (one if written form; zero if presented orally) 
 Enforcement of judgment (one if written form; zero if presented orally) 
o I assumed these indicators primarily affect the judicial bureaucracy, not lawyers or 
judges, and thus attributed a value of 0.5; however, In a less stringent view, lawyers 
may again benefit from written statements which they may need to interpret; and judges 
may have a heavier bureaucratic burden;  
 
 
LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 
 
 Complaint must be legally justified (zero if not required, one if required) 
 Judgment must be legally justified (zero if not required, one if required) 
 Judgment must be on law (not on equity) (zero if not required, one if required) 
o Measures whether these various steps in the process need to include references 
to the laws, legal reasoning and formalities. I assume that lawyers benefit from 
this requirement because it generates a premium on their skill-set and reinforces 
their exclusivity in the process; judges have more discretionary power if they 
can judge the case on precedent, or on their assessment of the facts of the case, 
irrespective of technical issues.     
 
 
STATUTORY REGULATIONS OF EVIDENCE 
 
 Judge cannot introduce evidence (zero if judge can and one if judge cannot) 
 Judge cannot reject irrelevant evidence (zero if judge can and one if judge cannot) 
 Out-of-court statements are inadmissible (zero if admissible, one if inadmissible) 
o I assume judges want to have these capacities (including weighing in out-of-court 
statements) as it gives them more control over the process; lawyers, inversely, lose 
leverage and predictability if judges have these capacities. 
 
 Mandatory prequalification [by judges] of questions (zero if non-mandatory, one if 
mandatory) 
 Oral interrogation only by judge(zero if opposing party can interrogate, one if only 
judge) 
o Judges will prefer to have these powers (note that in this case their preference is toward 
higher formalism), because they reinforces their centrality in the process and the ability 
to steer the proceedings in accordance with their will. Lawyers have an inverse 
preference for the same reasons.  
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 Only original documents and certified copies are admissible (zero if non-original 
accepted, one if only originals) 
o I assume both judges and lawyers are ambiguous; sometimes both benefit from this 
requirement but in other cases it may act as a constraint. 
 
 Authenticity and weight of evidence defined by law (zero if not defined by law, one if 
defined by law) 
o When zero, this means that the judge has the discretion to evaluate the authenticity and 
weight of evidence, gaining more power over the process; lawyers on average will 
prefer that the judge is constrained in this role; judges’s discretion introduces 
unpredictability. 
 Mandatory recording of evidence (zero if non-mandatory, one if mandatory) 
o I assume that this is a mainly bureaucratic issue and both judges and lawyers will 
probably be indifferent (a value of 0.5) 
 
 
CONTROL OF SUPERIOR REVIEW 
 
 Enforcement of judgment is automatically suspended until resolution of the appeal 
(zero if not automatic, or there can be no appeal, one if automatically suspended) 
 Comprehensive review in appeal (zero if only new evidence can be reviewed, one if 
issues of both law and fact can be reviewed)  
 Interlocutory appeals are allowed (zero if prohibited, one if allowed) 
o In the three variables of superior review I assume lawyers gain from having the 
maximum extent possible of superior review and judges lose. If a judge’s decision is 
final, it has more weight, whereas in the case of superior review, the decision may be 
overruled. Lawyers on average gain from having this additional recourse, which 
protects them against individual judges, minimizes the cost of eventual mistakes, 
increases chances of success, the duration of trial and, potentially,  of fees.  
 
 
ENGAGEMENT FORMALITIES 
 
 Mandatory pretrial conciliation (zero if non-mandatory, one if mandatory) 
o I assume that for both judges and lawyers preferences regarding this procedure are 
ambiguous. This creates a further layer in the process and increases the bureaucratic 
burden on the judge but it may also allow judges to focus on more complex cases; if 
successful, a pretrial conciliations reduces the demands for the lawyer but at the same 
time may be valued by the client and may depend on the effectiveness of the lawyer; if 
mandatory and unsuccessful on most occasion, this increases the duration of the case.  
 
 Service of process by judicial officer required (zero if not required, one if required) 
 Notification of judgment by judicial officer required (zero if not required, one if 
required) 
o I assume that both judges and lawyers are mostly indifferent regarding these 
requirements, which primarily affect the judicial bureaucracy, although these obligation 
may potentially have some implication on the work load of judges and lawyers, 
something which may be a negative for judges and a positive for lawyers.  
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INDEPENDENT PROCEDURAL ACTIONS 
 
 Filling and service (total number of actions) 
 Trial and Judgment (total number of actions) 
 Enforcement (total number of actions) 
o These indicators add the number of independent procedural actions required in each to 
these three steps of the trial. I assume lawyers on average benefit from increased steps 
as it maximizes their intervention and the utilization of their specific and exclusive 
skill-set; it also increases duration and potentially allows strategic delays of the case; 
judges are assumed to prefer less steps, as it lowers their bureaucratic load and 
increases their control over the process. Djankov et al. (2003) obtain a value for these 
dimensions by observing across their sample countries the minimum and maximum 
number of procedures and normalizing it to fall between zero and one. In defining my 
value, and because the assumption is that lawyers want more and judges less steps, for 
lawyers preferences I added 20% to the average of the eviction of a tenant and 
collection of a check index for Portugal (a country with above average formalism) and 
for judges I subtracted 20% from the same number. Although somewhat arbitrary (but 
conservative) this decision does not affect the results and it is the signal, not the 
magnitude, which is of primary importance.   
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Appendix II: Sample countries, by type of law system 
 
Civil Law Countries: 
Argentina 
Austria 
Belgium 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Cote D'Ivoire 
Croatia 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Georgia 
Germany 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Indonesia 
Italy 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Korea 
Kuwait 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Mexico 
Monaco 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Netherlands 
Netherlands Antilles 
Norway 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Russia 
Senegal 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Taiwan 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Ukraine 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Common Law Countries 
Anguilla 
Australia 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Belize 
Bermuda 
Botswana 
BVI 
Canada 
Cayman 
Cyprus 
Ghana 
Gibraltar 
Grenada 
Hong Kong 
India 
Ireland 
Israel 
Jamaica 
Kenya 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Namibia 
New Zealand 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Sri Lanka 
St. Vincent 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Turks and Caicos 
UAE 
Uganda 
United Kingdom 
USA 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
 
 
  
